LIVE · cybersecurity feed
Live wire
Malware Hijacks Android Car Head UnitsCritical Flaw in NASA/JPL Open-Source Spacecraft Command Software Allowed Unauthenticated Command ExecutionCVE-2026-73570 · U.S. CISA adds Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogCVE-2024-3094 · Connecting the Dots: Securing the Overlooked Corners of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) Supply Chain14 Trojanized npm Packages Drop RedC2 4.0 Linux Backdoor With AI-Assisted C2Hundreds of leaked AWS keys give full control over corporate accountsAndroid Car Malware Spreads Through Built-In Updaters for Ad Fraud, Proxy BotnetMalware injected into popular Rust packages to steal developer credentialsSix Maximum-Severity Flaws Found in Cisco ProductsCritical Isolated-vm Vulnerability Leads to RCE on Host
iothigh

Inside the Cross-Platform Propagation of a New Gafgyt Variant C0XMO

A new variant of the Gafgyt malware, named C0XMO, has been identified. This variant is notable for its ability to exploit DD-WRT firmware and spread across multiple processor architectures, thereby increasing the reach of its Internet of Things botnet.

zeroday.news ·

FortiGuard Labs has identified a new variant of the Gafgyt botnet, dubbed C0XMO, which exhibits cross-platform propagation capabilities by exploiting a vulnerability in DD-WRT router firmware. The malware, discovered in March, utilizes CVE-2021-27137 to gain initial access. A notable characteristic of C0XMO is its separation of lateral movement functions into a distinct Python script, allowing for more efficient targeting of diverse system architectures and device types.

The exploitation of CVE-2021-27137, a stack buffer overflow flaw within the UPnP service of vulnerable DD-WRT firmware, is the primary infection vector. Attackers send specially crafted M-SEARCH requests via UDP port 1900, which the SSDP parser in the affected firmware mishandles when encountering oversized ST:uuid: values. While an attack was observed targeting a Japanese technology firm, the originating IP address was traced to Germany. Once compromised, the affected host downloads the malware to a temporary directory.

Analysis of C0XMO revealed multiple compiled samples for various Linux architectures, including ARM, MC68000, MIPS R3000, PowerPC, SuperH, Intel 80836, and AMD64. This broad compilation strategy enhances the botnet's reach across a wide range of devices.

C0XMO shares common traits with other Gafgyt variants, such as employing weak-credential brute-force attacks against Telnet and SSH, incorporating embedded command-injection vulnerabilities, and supporting various Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack techniques.

Upon execution on a compromised system, C0XMO implements a four-stage persistence mechanism. This involves setting up persistence, copying itself to multiple locations, configuring auto-start routines, and terminating competing processes. The malware first checks its execution path to ensure persistence. It then creates several hidden file paths, including directories within /tmp, /var/tmp, and /dev/shm. C0XMO copies itself to these hidden locations and sets execute permissions. If a home directory exists, it also copies itself there.

To maintain persistence, C0XMO creates cron jobs that schedule its execution every 15 minutes. Additionally, it appends execution commands to common shell profile files like ~/.profile, ~/.bashrc, and ~/.bash_profile, ensuring the malware restarts if terminated.

A significant feature of C0XMO is its "competitor killing" functionality. After establishing local persistence, the malware scans all active processes on the system. It maintains an internal blacklist of process names, targeting botnet malware, network services, programming tools, and red team utilities. If a process name matches an entry on this blacklist, C0XMO terminates it. The malware also checks the executable paths of terminated processes against a path blacklist and deletes matching files. Furthermore, C0XMO actively attempts to eliminate rival botnets by not only deleting their binaries but also removing their associated persistence mechanisms, such as cron jobs, rc.local entries, and system services.

Following local persistence setup, C0XMO establishes a connection to its command and control (C2) server located at 85[.]215[.]131[.]70. The malware employs a custom handshake protocol, beginning with a specific magic string and a shared secret. The C2 server confirms the handshake with "HANDSHAKE_OK," after which C0XMO identifies itself as a botnet node. The handshake concludes with a final magic value, prompting a welcome message from the server.

The botnet supports five primary commands received from the C2 server: ping, stop, scan, stopscan, and attack-related commands. The ping command functions as a heartbeat mechanism, with the infected host responding with "PONG" if active.

C0XMO is equipped to launch 19 different types of DDoS attacks, encompassing UDP and TCP floods, SYN floods, amplification attacks (NTP, Memcached), ICMP floods, Ping of Death, and various HTTP-based attacks designed to exhaust resources or bypass defenses like Cloudflare.

Unlike many botnets, C0XMO isolates its scanning functionality into a separate Python script. This script is downloaded from the same IP address and port used for distributing the main C0XMO binary. The scanner script requires several Python packages, including requests, paramiko, and beautifulsoup4, for network communication and SSH/Telnet interactions. The scanner is executed with arguments specifying random IP scanning, target ports, runtime duration, and the C2 server address. The scanner itself is organized into six categories: Worker, Blacklist, Telnet, SSH, HTTP Exploit, and ADB Exploit.

iotmalwarebotnetvulnerability
ShareXLinkedInWhatsAppFacebook

More News

view all →
security

Postal Service moves to finalize mail ballot regs before SCOTUS ruling

The rules have already been rejected by multiple state courts, but the Trump administration said it’s preparing in case of a favorable Supreme Court decision. The post Postal Service moves to finalize mail ballot regs before SCOTUS ruling appeared first on CyberScoop.

vulnerability

ToxicPanda 2.0 Gets a Major Upgrade, Expanding Attacks Across 16 Countries

ToxicPanda 2.0 targets 349 financial apps and abuses Android Wireless Debugging to gain deeper device access and steal banking credentials. ToxicPanda used to be a Europe-focused nuisance targeting a manageable list of banks. That version is gone. Zimperium’s zLabs team just documented ToxicPanda 2.0, and the numbers alone tell the story: 349 targeted financial institutions […]

ai

If you're not using AI to attack your own systems, your adversaries will

Agents are also the new attack surface - cue defenders' existential angst

privacy

TikTok Agrees to $400 Million Settlement in U.S. Child Privacy Lawsuit

TikTok has agreed to a $400 million settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice to resolve a lawsuit alleging violations of child privacy laws. The lawsuit, filed in 2024, accused the company of improperly collecting data from users under 13 and failing to comply with parental requests to delete accounts. The settlement includes an immediate payment of $300 million and an additional $100 million contingent on the dissolution of a prior consent decree related to Musical.ly.

malware

Hackers infect Android car head units with proxy botnet malware

A supply-chain attack targeting Android-based car head units is using a legitimate device-update app to spread malware that enlists compromised devices in a proxy botnet or uses them for ad fraud. [...]

security

Named Pipes Under Attack: Securing Windows Interprocess Communication

Windows named pipes provide fast interprocess communication, but weak access controls can expose privileged services to untrusted processes. ThreatLocker explains how endpoint verification, command authorization, strict input validation, and narrowly scoped privileges can help secure named-pipe communication. [...]