New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) has accused Chinese entities of attempting to establish space infrastructure within the country for military intelligence gathering. This allegation was detailed in the NZSIS’s annual threat environment assessment, released by Director-General of Security Andrew Hampton.
The report highlights New Zealand’s growing space sector, noting its geographical suitability for Ground Based Space Infrastructure (GBSI) used for tracking satellites, space debris, and collecting scientific data. However, the NZSIS warns that such infrastructure is also attractive to foreign states seeking to advance military capabilities and intelligence operations.
As a case study, the assessment cited a China-based organization identified as "Purple Mountain Observatory," which reportedly has "close links" to Beijing. This organization allegedly attempted to install GBSI in New Zealand, collaborating with a local company that was likely unaware of the equipment's potential for collecting military intelligence or the ultimate recipients of the data. The NZSIS believes Purple Mountain would have willingly shared any collected data, noting that Chinese laws could compel such an organization to provide information to the Chinese government.
The NZSIS stated that it successfully disrupted this particular activity, but indicated it was not the first attempt by Purple Mountain Observatory to install its own GBSI in New Zealand, and likely would not be the last. The report identifies China as the only country observed to be targeting New Zealand "at scale."
Beyond space infrastructure, the assessment also detailed China's military intelligence services' increased targeting of professional networking sites and online job platforms for espionage. Chinese intelligence officers, or their affiliates, reportedly pose as consultants or employees of think tanks or recruitment firms, posting job advertisements for analysts in foreign policy, international relations, defense, or security. Candidates are then vetted to assess their access to information and willingness to divulge it. These job offers are described as lucrative, with intelligence officers often encouraging candidates to retain their government positions to maintain information flow and create opportunities for recruiting colleagues.
The report also suggested that some recent cyberattacks were likely carried out by state-backed groups aiming to destabilize New Zealand.
Domestically, the NZSIS faces challenges in identifying violent extremism amidst a vast and complex online landscape. The report describes this task as "looking for the sharpest needle in endless giant stacks of needles," a shift from the previous analogy of finding a needle in a haystack. The proliferation of toxic content, widespread anonymity, and hidden online locations complicate efforts to differentiate genuine support for violent extremism from hateful language or content designed merely for engagement.
The NZSIS monitors encrypted messaging services and gaming platforms to counter violent online communities. The report notes that algorithms on social media platforms can link non-violent content to progressively more extreme material, potentially exposing individuals to violent extremist content that supports radicalization. New Zealand violent extremists are also observed using encrypted messaging systems, social media, and online gaming platforms to circulate violent material, including weapon tutorials and objectionable content, and to find like-minded individuals.
