ConnectWise is currently investigating an active malware campaign targeting managed service providers (MSPs) that leverages the company’s ScreenConnect remote access and support platform. The campaign, which began gaining traction around 17:47 UTC on November 11, 2026, involves the unauthorized deployment of rogue remote-access clients to devices managed by MSPs. Cybersecurity researchers at Huntress identified the activity, noting that the scope of the breach is expanding rapidly, with at least six MSPs and 286 endpoints across 47 organizations confirmed as affected.
The attackers are reportedly utilizing the built-in Run Command functionality within ScreenConnect to install unauthorized clients on managed endpoints. This method allows the intruders to maintain persistent remote access to customer devices outside of the legitimate MSP’s control environment. Beyond simple unauthorized access, researchers have raised concerns regarding a potential reverse-pivot technique. This method could theoretically allow attackers to compromise an MSP technician's workstation when that technician initiates a remote support session with an already infected customer device. It remains unconfirmed whether this technique exploits a specific software vulnerability or simply abuses legitimate, intended features of the ScreenConnect platform.
ConnectWise has officially acknowledged the reports of malicious activity and confirmed that it is actively investigating the situation. In a statement, the company advised its partners to exercise extreme caution, specifically recommending that they avoid opening interactive ScreenConnect sessions with any devices suspected of being compromised. Instead, the vendor suggests using alternative, separate security tools to conduct investigations. Furthermore, ConnectWise has urged all partners to review their account activity logs, revoke any active sessions, reset credentials from a secure and trusted device, and ensure that multifactor authentication is properly verified.
While the exact method used by the attackers to gain initial access to the MSP environments has not been definitively determined, current telemetry suggests the use of compromised credentials and the hijacking of existing, legitimate support sessions. Researchers have also observed sequential identifiers assigned by the attackers, which implies that additional MSPs may have been compromised prior to the current surge in activity. Consequently, users are being advised to audit their Run Command history for any signs of unauthorized activity, regardless of whether they have received specific security alerts.
The campaign is associated with several indicators of compromise, including specific rogue ScreenConnect client IDs such as 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091. Researchers have also identified malicious infrastructure, including C2 domains like newnewnew.gotdns[.]org and soxnewwork.homedns[.]org, as well as an attacker-controlled relay at 185.99.255[.]28. Additionally, several files have been linked to the operation, including scripts titled Panel-Lateral.ps1 and Run-Lateral-Full.bat, along with an executable named ToolboxRelayUploader.exe.
Evidence suggests that elements of this malicious activity may have existed months before the current campaign was disclosed. A batch script discovered in July 2026, which impersonated a Social Security Administration statement, was found to reference one of the same rogue ScreenConnect client IDs identified in the recent attacks. That earlier script was designed to establish persistence on Windows systems and communicate with external servers to retrieve installation commands.
While the July activity appears to have been part of a phishing-based distribution campaign, it is currently unclear if it is directly linked to the more recent, targeted attacks against MSPs. ConnectWise has stated that it will continue to provide guidance and updates through its official Trust Center as the investigation progresses. For now, the primary recommendation for MSPs remains a thorough review of their environments for any of the identified indicators of compromise and a strict avoidance of interactive sessions with potentially infected endpoints.





