Security researchers have identified a persistent and evolving campaign of vishing-led cyberattacks targeting data-intensive industries across the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Since August 2026, a network of threat actors associated with the Com collective has conducted a series of data theft and extortion operations. These attacks primarily target the financial, healthcare, and legal sectors, utilizing a combination of social engineering and sophisticated proxy infrastructure to bypass multi-factor authentication.
The campaign is attributed to several distinct activity clusters, including the group known as Bling Libra, also identified as ShinyHunters. Other tracked clusters include those designated as Redact, Pink, Falcon, and Helix. More recently, researchers have uncovered two additional clusters, Vortex and Cinder, which share operational overlaps with activity monitored by other industry analysts under the designation UNC6671.
The Vortex cluster, identified in September 2026, focuses heavily on healthcare and pharmaceutical organizations. Attackers gain initial access by posing as internal IT support staff during vishing calls, directing employees to adversary-in-the-middle proxy servers. These servers facilitate the real-time capture of credentials and multi-factor authentication tokens. Once access is established, the attackers frequently enroll unauthorized devices to maintain persistence, with researchers noting the repeated use of a specific device model, the Pixel 10a, across multiple compromised accounts. Data exfiltration from Microsoft 365 services, including OneDrive, SharePoint, and email, is subsequently automated using Python-based scripts.
The Cinder cluster, also emerging in September 2026, employs a similar vishing methodology but utilizes a different technical approach to bypass security controls. Rather than re-triggering authentication prompts, these actors replay persistent session tokens to maintain access. Once inside the environment, they utilize the Microsoft Graph software development kit and automated scripts to harvest sensitive data. In both the Vortex and Cinder operations, the attackers confirm their success by sending extortion demands directly to employees via Microsoft Teams or internal email, directing victims to negotiation sites hosted on the Tor network.
Beyond credential harvesting, researchers have documented the use of custom, malicious browser extensions to facilitate deeper system compromise. Specifically, the cluster tracked as Helix has been observed distributing a browser extension disguised as a legitimate Google Chrome component. This malicious tool, identified as version 1.6.111 and later 1.6.112, is not available on official web stores and must be sideloaded by the victim through the browser’s Developer Mode.
Once active, the extension disguises itself to suppress browser warnings and performs a wide range of unauthorized activities. These include global keystroke logging, the theft of session storage and authentication cookies, and the harvesting of QR codes used for MFA. Furthermore, the extension leverages the Chrome DevTools Protocol to grant attackers remote control capabilities, such as capturing screenshots, monitoring webcam feeds, stealing clipboard contents, and navigating the browser remotely.
The infrastructure underlying these operations relies heavily on domain registration services such as NiceNIC and Cnobin, often protected by Cloudflare or DDoS-Guard. While the attackers claim responsibility for these breaches through their extortion messages, the technical details of the exfiltration and the use of sideloaded extensions remain confirmed through independent telemetry and incident response analysis. Organizations are advised to monitor for unauthorized MFA device enrollments and the presence of suspicious browser extensions as primary indicators of compromise associated with these Com-affiliated actors.






