Certificate authority eMudhra has revoked an additional eight intermediate CA certificates following an internal investigation into the improper handling of private keys. This action brings the total number of revoked intermediate certificates to 16. The company confirmed that the security failure stemmed from a custom Python script utilized in April 2025 to migrate private keys between hardware security modules (HSMs) during a period of hardware procurement delays.
The initial eight certificates, which were identified in October 2026, were compromised due to a bug in the script that reduced ECDSA private keys to a single byte. This flaw rendered the keys trivial to recover, as they could be cracked by testing only 256 possible values. A security researcher named Wayne first disclosed this vulnerability on October 17, prompting major browser and operating system vendors—including Google, Apple, and Mozilla—to revoke trust in the affected certificates. Microsoft subsequently issued out-of-band updates on October 26 to remove trust in the compromised chains for Windows systems.
The eight newly revoked certificates involve RSA keys. According to the company, these keys were not weakened to the same extent as the ECDSA keys; however, the investigation revealed that the migration script processed these RSA keys in the memory of the host computer rather than maintaining them within the secure environment of the HSM. Because this process violated the company’s certificate security policies, eMudhra determined that these certificates no longer met required standards and revoked them on November 7.
The affected RSA intermediate certificates had been in active use since May 2026, with the most recent certificate issued on November 3. These intermediates were utilized for both code-signing and TLS certificate issuance. eMudhra stated that all customer certificates impacted by these revocations have since been migrated or replaced.
The investigation also uncovered evidence that the company missed an opportunity to identify the faulty key-generation process over a year ago. In June 2025, eMudhra detected certificate revocation lists (CRLs) signed with keys that did not correspond to the associated CA certificates. While the company resolved the immediate issue by resigning the lists with the correct keys, it failed to conduct a root-cause analysis at that time. The recent report confirms that this event was an early indicator of the underlying flaw that remained undetected until October 2026.
Internal audits further revealed that eMudhra lacked sufficient verification procedures to confirm the strength of generated private keys or to ensure that the keys utilized for certification matched those originally produced within the HSM. These procedural failures allowed the faulty script to operate without oversight for an extended period.
Despite the severity of the key handling errors, eMudhra maintains that there is no evidence the compromised keys were exploited by malicious actors. To address the systemic failures, the company has commissioned an independent review by KPMG, with findings scheduled for release on December 4. This review is intended to identify necessary improvements to the firm's key-generation and certificate management workflows.
In the wake of these security incidents, eMudhra has announced its intention to exit the publicly trusted TLS certificate market entirely. The company is currently transitioning its remaining customers to alternative providers and plans to cease issuing certificates under its G1 hierarchy by November 16.





