A significant supply chain attack has compromised the digital experience platform Optimizely, resulting in the injection of malicious JavaScript into the websites of numerous high-profile organizations. By embedding unauthorized code into customer projects, attackers successfully leveraged Optimizely’s content delivery network to distribute malware to visitors of major sites, including Zoom, CNN, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, and various others.
The security incident was first identified by researcher Scott Helme, whose analysis of 1,611 scripts associated with the platform revealed that 188 JavaScript files across 178 organizations had been tampered with. Independent verification through historical records from urlscan.io confirmed that the malicious activity affected a broad range of entities, such as KLM, American Girl, Smartsheet, Stamps.com, Bitly, UNICEF USA, and Optimizely’s own web properties.
The injected code was designed to fetch a secondary payload from a remote server located at the domain 1688360[.]cc. To evade detection, the attackers employed various obfuscation techniques, including direct URL references, Base64 encoding, and the use of the JavaScript atob() function. In some instances, the scripts included fallback mechanisms that could execute embedded malicious code if the connection to the external server was blocked.
Once active, the malware demonstrated several sophisticated capabilities. It functioned as a cryptocurrency drainer by monitoring webpages for wallet addresses and replacing them with attacker-controlled destinations. It also acted as a digital skimmer, capturing sensitive payment card information—including card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes—and transmitting the data to a file named card.php on the attacker-controlled server.
Furthermore, the attack targeted mobile users by delivering secondary payloads identified as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, which are designed to target vulnerabilities in specific iOS versions. The malicious scripts were also capable of harvesting browser cookies, recording webpage URLs, and capturing screenshots of the user's session.
Financial data associated with the attacker’s cryptocurrency wallets suggests the campaign was successful in its objectives. As of November 16, the monitored addresses had received approximately $7,000 in various cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Tether, confirming that the clipboard-hijacking component was actively diverting funds.
While the earliest signs of the script hijacking were traced to the morning of November 16, the mechanism behind the compromise remains unconfirmed. It is currently unknown whether the attackers gained unauthorized access through a breach of Optimizely’s internal infrastructure, the theft of customer credentials, or another vector. Optimizely has not yet provided a public statement regarding the root cause of the incident.
By late evening on November 16, remediation efforts appeared to be underway, with the vast majority of the compromised files cleaned. Helme reported that as of 21:52 UTC, only one of the previously identified infected scripts remained active. The incident highlights the ongoing risks associated with third-party supply chain dependencies, where a single point of failure can facilitate widespread malware distribution across the global web.





