Ransomware groups are increasingly targeting backup infrastructure, aiming to neutralize recovery options before encrypting primary systems. This tactic significantly increases pressure on victims to pay ransoms, as the ability to restore data independently is compromised. Recent incidents highlight a shift in attacker methodology, moving beyond merely encrypting data to actively seeking out and destroying an organization's recovery points.
One notable incident involved the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group, which in February 2024, encrypted Change Healthcare's systems. The attackers gained access via a remote portal lacking multi-factor authentication. Change Healthcare's backups were reportedly not sufficiently isolated or robust to facilitate a rapid recovery. UnitedHealth, the parent company, confirmed paying a $22 million ransom, yet still faced an estimated $1.6 billion in total recovery costs.
Earlier, in 2021, the BlackMatter ransomware group established backup destruction as a standard operating procedure. In attacks against agricultural cooperatives NEW Cooperative and Crystal Valley, the group utilized compromised administrative credentials to locate and wipe or reformat all backup data stores and appliances on the network before proceeding with encryption. Federal agencies, including CISA, the FBI, and the NSA, documented this tactic, noting BlackMatter's ransom demands ranged from $80,000 to $15 million in Bitcoin and Monero.
The Gunra ransomware, detailed in a joint CISA and FBI advisory in August 2026, demonstrated an even more advanced approach. In one confirmed case, attackers managed to delete backup and archived data not only at the victim's primary data center but also at its disaster recovery site. This was achieved using a single set of stolen credentials, illustrating that having multiple copies in different locations offers little protection if those locations share a common administrative access point.
These attacks reveal common vulnerabilities in backup strategies. Often, backup environments share network access and administrative credentials with production systems, making them susceptible if those credentials are compromised. Furthermore, security measures for recovery environments, such as patching and monitoring, frequently lag behind those applied to production systems. Backup software is often treated as an appliance and may not be updated with the same urgency, leaving known vulnerabilities unpatched. For instance, the Akira ransomware group exploited a vulnerability for which a patch had been available for over a year in an attack on an airline.
The financial implications of losing backups are substantial. IBM's 2025 Cost of a Data Breach Report indicated an average ransomware incident cost of $5.08 million. Beyond direct financial losses, IBM's 2026 research found that 41% of ransomware incidents also included threats to damage the victim's brand reputation. Without viable backups, organizations lose critical leverage to refuse ransom demands.
To counter these evolving threats, cybersecurity experts recommend treating the recovery environment as critical infrastructure. This includes implementing immutable storage, such as cloud object lock features, which prevent backup copies from being altered or deleted even by administrators. True network and credential isolation between production and backup environments is essential, along with multi-factor authentication and role-based access controls for backup infrastructure. Regular and urgent patching of backup software, aligning with production system patch cycles, is also crucial. Finally, organizations should conduct frequent restore testing, including attack scenario simulations, rather than merely verifying backups exist, to ensure recovery capabilities are functional when needed.
Despite awareness of these risks and necessary improvements, many organizations face challenges in implementation due to limited budget, staff, and operational capacity. A recent cybersecurity report indicated that almost 77% of IT organizations believe their cybersecurity investment is not keeping pace with threats, and 65% of Managed Service Providers (MSPs) report their clients are underinvesting. This gap between understanding the need for stronger security and the ability to implement it remains a significant hurdle in protecting against sophisticated ransomware attacks.
