A previously unidentified threat actor, tracked as SilentAir, has been discovered infiltrating mobile network infrastructure to intercept calls and text messages. According to research from the cybersecurity firm Enea, the group focuses its operations on compromising mobile operator nodes, primarily targeting subscribers in Taiwan. While the firm assesses with high confidence that SilentAir operates as a state-level entity, it maintains only low confidence in the theory that the group is aligned with China-nexus operations. This assessment is based on the group's specific interest in Taiwan, the notable absence of Chinese targets, and the observation that their activity typically aligns with standard working hours in Chinese time zones.
The attackers gain unauthorized access to signaling protocols, specifically leveraging SS7 and, on occasion, Diameter, to reroute incoming communications. By hijacking nodes within mobile operator networks, SilentAir can harvest subscriber information and intercept SMS and voice traffic. While the group is capable of tracking the physical location of targets, researchers note that this functionality represents only a minor portion of their overall activity. To verify the success of their interception efforts, the attackers frequently deploy silent SMS messages, which are designed to remain invisible to the recipient’s device.
Enea has been monitoring these activities since early 2025, though retrospective analysis indicates that the group’s suspicious behavior predates that timeframe. The scope of the campaign is global, with hijacked nodes identified across at least six Asian countries. Beyond the primary focus on Taiwan, the group has extended its reach to approximately a dozen other nations and territories, including locations in East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. High-profile government and political figures have been identified as specific targets of these operations.
In addition to the SilentAir campaign, Enea’s research highlights the activity of another group known as Liminal Panda, which has been observed exploiting the IPX network—the interconnect infrastructure mobile operators utilize for traffic exchange. Since the first quarter of 2026, researchers have identified Liminal Panda deploying a backdoor known as GTPDoor. Enea has successfully blocked several hundred attempts by this group to establish connections with command-and-control servers at various mobile operators.
Enea estimates that between five and ten mobile operators have already experienced potential infections related to Liminal Panda, with the total number of affected entities potentially reaching several dozen across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. While both SilentAir and Liminal Panda are active in the telecommunications sector, researchers have stated that there is currently insufficient evidence to definitively confirm a connection between the two groups.
The findings underscore a persistent vulnerability within the global mobile signaling ecosystem. By compromising the internal infrastructure of mobile operators, these actors are able to bypass traditional security perimeters to conduct surveillance on high-value targets. The use of both SS7 and Diameter protocols, combined with the exploitation of IPX interconnects, demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the underlying architecture that supports international mobile communications.
As of the latest reports, the investigation into these clusters of activity remains ongoing. Enea continues to monitor for signs of compromise across its customer base, emphasizing the risk posed by actors capable of manipulating the core signaling nodes that facilitate global connectivity. While the identity of the operators remains protected, the scale of the intrusion suggests a coordinated effort to maintain long-term access to sensitive communication channels.





