Researchers have developed a two-exploit chain that can achieve root access on the Google Pixel 10, starting from a zero-click attack vector. This chain builds upon previous work that demonstrated a similar exploit for the Pixel 9.
The first exploit targets a vulnerability in the Dolby Digital Plus (DD+) audio decoder, identified as CVE-2025-54957. While this vulnerability was patched in January 2026 across Android, researchers adapted their exploit for the Pixel 10. The primary adjustments involved updating memory offsets to match the specific library version on the Pixel 10. A key challenge was the Pixel 10's use of RET-PAC, which replaces the older -fstack-protector mechanism, meaning the usual __stack_chk_fail function was unavailable for overwriting. The researchers found a workaround by targeting `dap_cpdp_init`, an initialization function that is called only once and can be overwritten without impacting the decoder's functionality. This updated Dolby UDC exploit is effective on devices with a security patch level of December 2025 or earlier.
The second stage of the exploit chain, which previously leveraged the BigWave driver for local privilege escalation on the Pixel 9, could not be directly ported to the Pixel 10. This is because the BigWave driver is not present on the Pixel 10. However, a new driver, `/dev/vpu`, was identified within the mediacodec SELinux context. This driver interacts with the Chips&Media Wave677DV silicon, a component of the Tensor G5 chip designed for video decoding acceleration. Developers of this VPU driver are reportedly the same as those who developed the BigWave driver.
A significant vulnerability was discovered in this VPU driver. Unlike the standard Linux driver for older Chips&Media chips, the Pixel's driver for the WAVE677DV does not integrate with the Video for Linux API (V4L2). Instead, it directly exposes the chip's hardware interface, including memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) registers, to userspace. The driver handles device memory mappings, power management, and interrupt handling for the chip.
The critical flaw lies within the `vpu_mmap` function. This function is designed to map the VPU hardware's MMIO register region into userspace's virtual address space. However, the implementation of `remap_pfn_range` within this function is not bounded by the actual size of the register region. By specifying a larger size in an `mmap` system call, an attacker can map an arbitrary amount of physical memory into userspace, starting from the physical address of the VPU register region.
This allows for direct access and modification of the kernel image, including its code and data segments, which reside at a higher physical address than the VPU registers. Because the kernel's physical address is consistent on Pixel devices, the offset between the VPU memory region and the kernel is a known value. This eliminates the need to scan for the kernel in memory, enabling userspace to gain kernel code execution or other desired primitives with minimal code. Exploiting this vulnerability to achieve arbitrary read-write access to the kernel reportedly required only five lines of code and less than a day of development effort.
The VPU vulnerability was reported on November 24, 2025, and was classified as High severity by Android's Vulnerability Rewards Program. This is an improvement compared to the BigWave bug used in the Pixel 9 exploit chain, which had a similar security impact but was initially rated as Moderate severity. The improved triage reflects a positive shift in how such vulnerabilities are handled. The issue was patched in the February Pixel security bulletin, 71 days after its initial report, marking a notable speed in remediation for a reported Android driver bug.
The research highlights both progress and ongoing challenges in Android's security landscape. The efficient patching of the VPU vulnerability demonstrates advancements in Android's vulnerability triage and remediation processes, contributing to the security of a wide range of devices. However, the discovery of a severe and easily exploitable vulnerability in the VPU driver, shortly after issues were found in a related driver, underscores the continued need for more robust and security-conscious development practices within Android driver code. Vendors are encouraged to adopt proactive approaches to software security, including thorough code auditing, to prevent such vulnerabilities from reaching end-users.
