Check Point Security Gateways have been the target of a widespread, multi-stage exploitation campaign that began in late October 2026. The attacks utilized a combination of unpatched vulnerabilities and custom malware to gain root access, establish persistent backdoors, and, in some instances, deploy destructive wiper software. The activity, which has been observed globally, appears to have been opportunistic in nature, targeting organizations across various sectors rather than focusing on a specific industry.
The initial compromise vector involved the exploitation of the Mobile Access portal on vulnerable Check Point gateways. Researchers have identified this phase as a PHP2Shell attack, which leveraged vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. These exploits allowed attackers to gain an initial foothold. Shortly thereafter, the attackers escalated their privileges to root level by exploiting CVE-2026-123039, a local privilege-escalation flaw residing in the DynamicCLI IPC interface.
Following the escalation to root, the attackers installed PHP webshells within the portal’s login page directories. These files, initially simple command-execution tools, were later upgraded to more sophisticated versions that supported file uploads and required hardcoded keys for access. Persistence was further solidified through the deployment of a custom backdoor known as TSGA, which was launched from the device's temporary configuration directories. This tool provided the attackers with remote access, the ability to steal configurations, and the capacity to manipulate firewall logs.
A secondary component, identified as TSProxy, was installed as a library file to intercept and proxy network traffic, allowing the attackers to monitor connections while remaining undetected. Once inside the network, the attackers utilized a tool called gogo to map internal infrastructure. In several cases, this lateral movement led to the compromise of VMware ESXi hosts, where a Linux-based wiper tool named destroy_v6 was deployed. This wiper overwrote files with zeros and left behind a text file titled DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, which contained politically charged messages in Hebrew regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The campaign occurred in two distinct waves. The first, beginning on October 30, 2026, primarily targeted Israeli organizations and included the destructive wiper attacks. A second, broader wave followed on November 2, affecting organizations in multiple countries without evidence of data destruction. The attacks originated from a specific IP address, 130.94.19[.]204, and the timing of the scanning activity—between 00:00 and 09:00 UTC—aligns with standard business hours in China.
Attribution remains complex. The malware tools TSGA and TSProxy share significant technical commonalities with PhiliKit, a framework previously linked to the China-based threat group UNC5221. These similarities include shared encryption secrets, communication ports, and specific code structures. However, investigators have noted that the destructive nature of the attacks and the specific political themes of the wiper notes deviate from the typical patterns associated with UNC5221.
Check Point has acknowledged the campaign and confirmed that the exploitation activity began approximately one week after security patches were made available. The vendor is currently investigating several possibilities, including the potential that UNC5221 was involved, that the initial access was sold to a third party, or that the attackers deliberately planted misleading evidence to obscure their origins. The use of the brand name Dream in the wiper notes has also prompted speculation regarding a potential retaliatory motive, as a firm by that name recently published research on similar PHP2Shell attacks involving China-nexus actors.





