Fortra has issued a warning regarding a sophisticated social engineering campaign that utilizes email bombing to facilitate subsequent impersonation attacks on Microsoft Teams. In this sequence, attackers flood a target’s professional inbox with a high volume of automated messages, creating a distraction that serves to mask malicious activity and heighten the victim’s sense of urgency.
The technical mechanism relies on overwhelming the target’s email notifications to bury legitimate security alerts or administrative communications. By saturating the inbox, the threat actors ensure that the victim is preoccupied with clearing the clutter, making them more susceptible to follow-up contact. Once the inbox is sufficiently compromised, the attackers pivot to Microsoft Teams, where they pose as members of the organization’s IT support staff.
In this class of attack, the impersonators leverage the confusion generated by the initial email flood to establish a false sense of authority. By claiming to be investigating the ongoing email disruption, the attackers attempt to manipulate the user into providing sensitive credentials, multi-factor authentication codes, or remote access permissions. This social engineering tactic exploits the human tendency to trust internal support channels during a perceived technical crisis.
Products in this category, such as Microsoft Teams, are often targeted because they serve as primary hubs for internal communication and collaboration. When attackers successfully establish a rapport as internal support, they bypass traditional perimeter defenses by operating within the trusted environment of the enterprise platform. Organizations are typically advised to implement strict verification protocols for all IT support interactions, ensuring that employees can authenticate the identity of staff members through secondary, out-of-band channels.
Mitigation for this class of issue generally involves a combination of technical controls and user awareness training. Security teams are encouraged to monitor for anomalous spikes in email traffic that could indicate a precursor to a social engineering attempt. Furthermore, reinforcing the policy that legitimate IT support will never request passwords or MFA tokens over chat platforms remains a critical defense against these types of impersonation campaigns.
This incident highlights the evolving nature of hybrid attack vectors, where attackers combine automated nuisance tactics with targeted human manipulation. As organizations continue to rely on integrated communication suites, the boundary between technical system alerts and social engineering becomes increasingly blurred. This trend underscores the necessity for security strategies that account for the psychological components of cyberattacks alongside traditional infrastructure hardening.





